The use of a modified input-output system for an economic program in Zambia by Seers, Dudley
THE USE OF 
A MODIFIED INPUT-OUTPUT SYSTEM 
FOR AN ECONOMIC PROGRAM 
IN ZAMBIA
by
Dudley Seers 
Communications No. 50
SEERS
COLLECTION
IN S T IT U T E  O F  D E V E L O P M E N T  STU D IES  
at the U N IV E R S IT Y  O F  SU SSEX
THE USE OF 
A MODIFIED INPUT-OUTPUT SYSTEM 
FOR AN ECONOMIC PROGRAM 
IN ZAMBIA
by
Dudley Seers 
Communications No. 50
Institute of Development Studies 
at the University of Sussex 
Falmer, Brighton,
England
THE USE 0Jy A MODIFIED INPjJT- 
OUTPUT'" SYSTEM TOR AN 
ECONOMIC PROGRAM ~IN ZAMBIA*
"by
Dudley Seers*
In a paper for the International Association for Research in Income and 
Wealth Conference at Corfu in 1963,^ I described an accounting system that 
had been used by the planning offices in Jamaica and Trinidad. The paper 
argued the case for disaggregation in an economy dependent on exports of 
primary products; but it concluded that, partly because of the difficulties 
of preparing a full input-output matrix, a simplified version is usually 
preferable.
Since that paper was written, the system advocated has been used by the 
United Nations Economic Mission to Zambia^ as a basic framework for its 
economic policy recommendations, and I will here restate the case in the 
light of this Zambian experience, with some of its results and problems.^
1. The need for a Modified Input-Output System in Developing Countries
Some degree of disaggregation is essential for any economy of this type 
because the prime movers consist of a-, few leading export sectors (often only 
one)„ To understand such an economy one needs to see the relations between 
these leading sectors and the remainder; a development plan consists essen­
tially of changing the economic structure and developing now sectors. 
Aggregative accounting systems are thus of only limited use, and we must look 
tov/ard Leontief rather than Keynes for our tools of analysis.
Yet the normal procedures of the interindustry operator need to be 
modified. first, the accounting frame has to be adapted to local circum­
stances. Because of lack of data, one probably cannot allocate the sales
of all the economically significant sectors which produce intermediate prod­
ucts to each of the industries which buy them. Cn the other hand, more detail
* I an grateful for comments by Mr. Bjerve, Director of the Statistical Office 
of Norway, Mr. Eleish of the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa, and 
Mr, Jolly, formerly Research Fellow at Makerere College, currently Ministry of 
Overseas Development Fellow at Cambridge, on loan as adviser on manpower 
planning to the government of Zambia. This paper is, of course, a purely 
personal contribution, based on work before I took up my present post.
1 "An Accounting System for Projections in a Specialised Exporter of Primary 
Products" (unpublished, 19^3)•
2 "The Economic Development of Zambia" (Government of Zambia, 1964)* The 
planning office of Tanganyika (as it then was) also made use of the system in 
drawing up the country's develop: lent plan,
3 The appendixes to this paper have b en adapted from the report of the 
United Nations Mission to Zambia.
+ This entire text, plus a comment by : .1 G. Clark, formed Chapter 8 of 
The Theory and Design of Economic ~v ment, Irma Adelman and
Srik Thorbecke, eds., The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 19&6, in cooperation 
with the Center for Agricultural and. Economic Development of Iowa, State 
University (AMES).
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is needed than for dovclwped countries. The payment of various sectors to the 
government should ho broken down to show the main taxes separately because 
their incidence varies greatly between sectors; expert industid.es and sub­
sistence production may need to be split off from the rest of the agricultural 
sector; and it may bo necessary to allow for the income and consumption of 
various racial groups because of different patterns of consumer behaviour and 
(possibly) different official employment objectives.
Second, several of the functions describing the development of the matrix 
nay be significantly nonlinear. Thus, export duties, income taxes on foreign 
companies, and marketing board profits usually increase more rapidly than 
exports. Moreover, the process of development involves the appearance of new 
industries and changes in the input coefficients of many already in existence.
Third, in these economies production is rarely determined endogenously.
The output of the leading export sector or sectors is largely determined by 
economic developments elsewhere; it has to be estimated from projections of 
world demand when there is a fairly competitive world market, or from company 
plans when the market is highly imperfect. A large fraction of the supply 
of nearly all other products is imported, often even cement and electricity; 
so output is usually estimated on the basis of what is physically feasible, 
imports being shown as a residual.
These modifications are needed in an economy dependent on exports of a 
few commodities: they would not (particularly the last one) apply with such
force to a diversified economy, such as Argentina. But one 01 the great 
merits of an input-output system is that it is highly flexible, end its constr­
uction and operation can be adapted to the type of economy end the data 
available.
II• A Practical Example: _ Uses in Zambia
The methods of constructing and projecting the matrix for Zambia are 
discussed in the attached Appendix A;^ ~ one of the projections is also shown, 
to illustrate the construction of the system. It will be seen that this was 
a very crude do-it-yourself business. We did not start out with a model for 
testing. We had four months to carry out a statistical exercise to throw 
light on the policy issues fared by the Mission.
Some policy issues, such e.s the future of the copper royalties (under whioh 
a lo.rgc portion of the value of copper exports was lost to the economy) wore 
big issues which needed as much statistical illumination as could be provided.
We started by constructing a set of projections on the assumptions that taxes 
and royalty arrangements remained unchanged. We could then see that if the 
government's objectives wore to bo achieved ’without undue stress on the balance 
of payments, certain increases in taxes and changes in royalty arrangements 
would be needed. We estimated that those would ensure a sum of public and 
private savings sufficient to finance the necessary scale of capital development 
We also concluded that in the case of Zambia, if policies recommended in the 
fiscal field (and in others) were ca.rried out, there 'would be no net need for 
foreign capital over the next five years; foreign reserves would be built up 
at the beginning and could be run down later. This naturally had a profound 
effect on the thinking of the Mission and, I believe, 011 subsequent government 
economic policy. The point is not only that a disaggregated system indicates
if This was prepared lor the Mission's report by Mr. Belai Abbai, an Ethiopian 
economist on the staff of the Economic Commission for Africa, 'who was the 
research officer on the mission, in charge of projections work.
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;ho magnitude of such "gaps” to be filled by policy. Realistic projections 
*nnnot be derived in any other way. especially in a period of structured, change, 
[ere extrapolation of past trends in global aggregates would be of little 
ralue.
Secondly, it helped us grasp quite quickly the economic structure and the 
lethod of operation of Zambia. This was partly because wo did not use a 
Jomputer. Those who project a matrix by hand get accustomed to the relative 
iagnitudes of the outputs of various sectors and of their factor and material 
requirements, and they really grasp (in a more profound sense than that of 
mderstanding a set of functions) how the structure night be expected to change 
luring the development process. Many problems of economic change are also 
thrown up in the course of using the system.
The third virtue of this system (or of any that is sufficiently disaggre­
gated) is that a strategy can bo devised which is internally consistent and 
prhich satisfies the main objectives of government policy. The contributions 
of the members of the Mission and its consultants, about twenty people can all 
be integrated more easily with the help of such a framework,5 Appendix B, an 
extract from the report, summarizes the main features of the strategy devised 
for Zambia. It brings out inter alia the interaction between development in 
agriculture and in industry; nobody who has worked with such a. system is likely 
to take sides in the a priori argument whether, in general, agriculture is more 
important than industry. 0
The projections had further uses which nay bo more novel, at least for 
developing countries. As Appendix C shows, they threw light on the likely 
pattern of money flows between the main sectors of the economy, pointing the 
way toward the basic financial strategy needed,7 They were also used to bring 
out the manpower needs of the program. Another major conclusion of the 
Mission was that the shortage of high-level manpower would be the main constraint 
(and an increasingly serious one) on the country’s economic growth. The
3 Another way of trying to ensure integration was by arranging meetings at which 
all those working on this exercise were invited to comment on each draft chapter.
6 In Trinidad, the projections showed that increases in exports of manufactures 
were a necesso.ry condition of fast growth; in Zambia increases in exports of 
minerals and f a m  products.
7 The method of extending the projection into the financial field was due to 
Dr. Potter Bjerve, and the work was carried out by a Swedish associate expert in 
economics, provided under the United Nations technical assistance program,
Mr. Esaieson.
3 This work was carried out by Mr. Richard Jolly. following one of the
recommendations of the Mission, a Manpower Planning Unit has been set up in 
Zambia, under Mr. Jolly, to guide manpower and educational policy. This unit 
has refined the original manpower projections in several ways, though still 
within the framework of the input-output matrix. In the first place, a, major 
survey of the skilled and educated labor force ’..'as undertaken in both the 
private and public sectors to provide a firmer base for future projections. 
Secondly, employers were asked about their future needs for manpower in relation 
to the programs for expansion, thus providing information which can be used to 
calculate sectoral employment-output ratios. Thirdly, these manpower data have 
been put on tape, so that future projections can be projected by a computer 
program. The parameters for thoir projections are the sectoral growth rates 
derived from the matrix, and the program forecasts the numbers required in 
particular* occupations for each combination of education and training. The 
computer makes it possible to run quickly a number of alternative projections, 
which is particularly useful for coordinating manpower planning with the 
day-to-day process of planning the economy as a whole.
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admittedly crude projections indicated the magnitude of the problem, making it 
easier for us to show what could be expected in a few years’ tine and thus to 
roach and present clearly the policy implications. These included proposals 
for accelerating educational and training programs, far talcing measures to 
retain and attract expatriates in professional fields, and for avoiding complex 
direct controls (sec Appendix D).
III. Problems Encountered in Zargbia
We encountered a number of problems in Zambia which, to a varying degree, 
must be faced in all similar exercises for developing countries.
In the first place, those mailing a set of projections of this kind are 
tempted to adopt an excessively mechanical approach to development programming, 
and we nay not have completely avoided this trap. Anyone using a matrix 
should not ignore the social changes involved in development or the political 
and administrative assumptions. But economists are very prone to do this 
anyway, and there is a real danger that anyone operating this (or any similar) 
model will become so absorbed in its manipulation that they will look on it as 
the core of development strategy, instead of the basis from which tho strategy 
can bo derived. To choose a few examples, the following repercussions may be 
overlooked: investment in housing and health services raises productivity;
tho adoption of social targets (such as universal primary education) affects 
public support for development and thus incremental capital-output ratios, as 
well as the extent of public cooperation in wage and fiscal policy; large 
programs in certain sectors may raise insoluble problems of project preparation 
and management, causing labor productivity to decline. Those of us who 
belonged to the United Nations Mission were uneasily aware that we made many 
tacit social assumptions, especially in tho fields of agriculture and wages 
policy. Some work was done on those questions (by consultants Mr. Ngrobo 
and Mr. Vilakazi), but there was no time to explore the social aspects 
thoroughly.
Another failing of economists, not attributable to use of a matrix but 
possibly aggravated by it, is the tendency to overlook physical realities, 
especially those affecting other sectors. In a large, developed economy, one 
can ignore the ef??octs of any particular project, but this is impossible if a 
big plant is built in Zambia. One project under consideration for manu­
facturing fertilizers, for example, will have a different effect if it is 
built in Livingstone, where there is spare hydroelectric capacity, than if it 
is built elsewhere; there is also some margin of choice over the type of 
fertilizers to be produced which would have implications for the extent to 
which the needs of the mining industry for explosives could bo net (and thus 
affect the import bill).
The Zambian work also suffered from some more basic deficiencies. Many 
problems were slurred over by jumping from a base-year pattern to one projected 
for several years later. The pace of development is generally not uniform.
Nor docs it have the same content throughout; unless certain typos of 
develop]lent materialize in tho early years, others will lag later. Using 
widely separate years permits, if it does not encourage, the economist to 
overlook the phasing of the development process. Wo also lost a good deal by 
failing to disaggregate sufficiently. Some cf the sectors used especially in 
manufacturing, are large and heterogeneous. It may not be true for all the 
industries in a given sector that production is supply-determined. The failure 
to allocate inputs in detail meant, moreover, that the projected increases in 
consumption of various intermediate products did not fully reflect the 
different rates of growth of different sectors.
Our treatment of fixed-capital investment was perfunctory. For two 
sectors, mining and industry, an attempt was mado to work out the approximate 
implications of the projected change in output. But elsewhere the methods 
were very crumo. In the ca.se of construction (mainly for the government and
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housing sectors) our starting point was the maximum rate of expansion in the 
period. Then we asked: Could the investment be financed? Was the increase
in capital approximately what was needed? The limit to construction was 
admittedly little more than a hunch; it was based on an assessment by our 
building consultant^ of how fast the construction industry night be expected 
to grow, taking into account the shortage of skilled building workers and of 
engineers and architects capable of preparing and carrying out projects.
Some experts criticized us for over-estimating this limit, but preliminary 
indications are that we may have under-estimated it because contractors are 
bringing in their own skilled personnel. The uncertainty in the rate at which 
construction could be expanded is serious, especially for Zambia at present, 
where neither savings nor foreign exchange is the dominant constraint. Had 
we felt that fixed investment could be expanded more quickly, we would have 
’ proposed a bigger development program.
Some of the statistics we used were very rough. The base itself was 
weak, especially on imports into various sectors, largely because the only 
firm trade statistics then available were for the Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland as a whole. (A new matrix which has been constructed for 1964 is 
very much bettor in this respect because trade returns for Zambia itself are 
at last available).
In addition, the coefficients may be wrong. The estimates of future 
productivity changes were little better than guesses; the data on past trends 
arc not helpful, partly because in many sectors activity has fallen, and 
partly boco.use the composition of the labor force is changing quite rapidly.
We do not place much confidence in the income—elasticities of demand either, 
though the results do not seen very sensitive to the assumptions made for 
these coefficients.
Future values of "exogenous" variables are subject to wide error. It is 
hard to pick a plausible price for copper in view of (1) the political un­
certainties in each of the main Southern Hemisphere producers, and (2) the 
economic uncertainties in each of the main Northern Hemisphere consumers.
(The problem is complicated by the unrepresentative nature of the London Metal 
Exchange quotation). Similar though less severe uncertainties exist for the 
volume of copper sales, rail and shipping tariffs, and others. Our assumption 
of constant domestic prices is a. serious weakness; although the copper price 
could fall to the rather low figure we used, wage changes are irreversible. 
Parallel increases in wages and import prices would not natter greatly, but 
wage increases in the past year have already been big enough to imperil our 
projections, especially of the volume of imports and employment. The output 
of some sectors is hard to project; the future course of agricultural 
production is the domain of the sociologist rather than the economist. 1
These problems reflect inevitable sources of error and inescapable 
uncertainties about the future when one is dealing with a country at such a 
low level of economic development. It would be helpful to call in the help
9 Mr. Turin, then an adviser to the Economic Commission for Africa*
10 Wage increases have a much more serious effect on employment in a developing 
country than in one already industrialized. I tried to show how this works
in the most obvious case, a petroleum economy, in "The Mechanism of an Open 
Petroleum Economy," Social and Economic Studies (March, 1.964)*
11 For example, a central question is whether means can be found for inducing 
"subsistence farmers" to use fertilizers and better techniques of planting 
maize.
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of p. computer in due course, after turning the system into an explicit model, 
and to recalculate the projections for 1970 on a number of assumptions (using 
the new 1964 base); they might well show quite wide differences.
IV• Is an Input-Output Matrix Worth Constructing?
In view of all those difficulties, it is natural to ask whether the input 
of the man-years of scarce labor that are required, oven for a rough set of 
projections such as we made, was worthwhile, and, in particular, whether the 
policy recommendations arc soundly based.
I agree in general with those who argue that it is dangerous to advocate 
the use of sophisticated programming methods in developing countries. There 
is a tragic, though understandable, tendency for young economists from devel­
oping countries to want to apply the latest techniques without inquiring 
whether they would be useful and feasible under local conditions, particularly 
whether the statistics would bear the analysis. In most countries, the result 
of proposing highly sophisticated systems (more complex than the one we used) 
is only too often to divert statisticians from more essential tasks and to 
encourage economists and even planning officials to live in a world so 
fanciful that "planning" is reduced to a set of functions and real policy issues 
are bypassed. Unfortunately, such tendencies e„re encouraged by some of those 
teaching "development economics".
My own view, which was, I believe, shared by my colleagues who worked 
with the matrix (see previous footnotes), is that the general pattern of 
Zambia's future development shows up so strongly that the projection system 
described was helpful and that the main policy conclusions were sufficiently 
well based.
An exercise like the one described above is not really one of "forecasting”; 
projecting a matrix is essentially making a "hypothetical” statement• If 
the mainly foreign—determined variables (export sales, import prices) behave 
in certain ways and the output of various goods and services changes and wages 
have a certain trend, then the objectives of the government cc.rry certain 
implications.
Some version of this system could be used for centred, policy advice in 
almost any developing country. Most countries have fairly complete trade 
statistics and output figures covering some of the main products. Any 
input-output table, constructed in this way, acts as a convenient working 
sheet for gathering statistical information and for devising aggregative 
accounts for households, savings and investment, and so forth.
Its central uses, however, are to help the economist gain insight into 
the working of the economy, especially its future potentialities, and to focus 
attention on the key issues of policy. A forward look for both the govern­
ment budget and the balance of payments will be needed. Projections of 
imports, for example, and thus of import duties are greatly improved, if 
allowance is made for the different rates of growth of different types of 
final and intermediate demand*
More important, this is the only way to assure consistency between 
expansion programs in various sectors. There is really no other way of 
assessing whether .any industrial or agricultural policy is likely to be 
supported by sufficient increases in domestic demand, allowing for government 
objectives in other fields and likely trends in exogenous variables. Even 
if some of the base-year figures have to be guessed, and very rough coeffi­
cients used, a simple matrix should be constructed. Provided the users are 
not naive, a disaggregated system can only be an improvement on a 'global' 
one. With further work, some of the weaknesses mentioned above can be 
nc.dc less serious.
APPENDIX A
(Adapted fron Appendix A of the Report of the United Nations
Mission to Zambia
Tho_Design of the Matrix
The basic frame for the projections is an adapted input-output table.
It contains fewer input columns than a table of this sort normally does 
because it only attempts to allocate certain basic inputs (imports, electricity, 
transport, and distribution) directly to the purchasing sector, while the 
rest are lumped together in one column. This is done because the statistics 
do not permit a finer breakdown and the table would have been unwieldy. The 
table also contains more columns than an input-output table would, in that it 
identifies the strategic policy variables, including direct and indirect taxes 
and ncnwage incomes payable at home and abroad; it also distinguishes between 
imports of intermediate products consumed by a sector and imports of finished 
products similar to those produced by the sone sector. The matrix includes 
the standard national a.ccounts for households, government revenue and expendi­
ture, saving and investment, and foreign p a y m e n t s . ^
Two dominant features of Zambia which were considered arc that Zambia is 
a primary exporter of minerals and that it has a nonhamogeneous social structure 
(Africans and Europeans). The analysis of mineral sales and of the incomes 
generated by this sector is central to the table; it is possible to trace the 
implication of a given rise in copper sales for employment incomes, tax receipts, 
royalties, and dividends arising from the industry. Employment incomes and 
consumption have been shown separately on the table for Africans and non- 
Africans; this separation is also appropriate for Zambia, since the consequence 
of a given rise in incomes for the pattern of consumption is different for the 
two racial groups. This also makes it possible to use different assumptions 
about the growth of population and employment for the two groups, which is 
particularly relevant during the period of transition.
The Base Year, 1961
13A table analogous to Table 1 was constructed for 1961 by Mr. Osborn.
It shows, in the rows narked 1 to 9 (condensed from 31 rows originally 
prepared), the productive sectors of the economy; below the horizontal line 
appear the main national income accounts, except for lino 10 which shows the 
supply and use of intermediate products (other than those given separately in 
columns 1 to 6). Items are shown as positive where they are payments by the 
accounting entity concerned, negative when they are receipts. Columns 24 to 
32 show the origin of the receipts of each productive sector, the total 
appearing in column 2 3; the other columns show how the supply is built up 
between imports (column 20) and domestic output (column ’\j), the latter being 
split again into inputs (columns 1 to 7) and value added, divided to show the 
income created (columns 8 to 18).
One problem arose out of the constitutional change after 1961, the base 
year. It was solved by including under "Government" not only the receipts 
and payments of the territorial government and the local authorities, but also 
the receipts by the federal government of taxes arising in Zambia (and the 
corresponding payments of federal departments that have now reverted to 
Zambian control). This made it possible to use the table as a base for 
projections into the post—federal period.
P Naturally the balance of payments shown here treats all other countries as 
"f oreign", including Malawi raid Southern Rhodesia.
r Of the statistical office of Rhodesia.
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- 13.6 - 0.3 - 7.3 - 5 .6 - 1.8 - 3.3 -42.6
- 6.4 - 1.7 - 6.5 - 7.1 - 7.4
- 4.4 - 6.5 -26.3 -23.6
- 12.4 - 2.3 - 1.7
- 12.0 - 7.4 - 1.0 - 1.1 - 3.0
- 39.5
-3 0 .2
- 4.7 -2 1 .7 - 7.0 - 7.0
-1 1 9 .2
182.1 + 1.1 
+6 7 .4
+56.0
+37.9 +33.5 ..+30.1 -47 ^ 7 » /j• ( +3 .0
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Mr. Osborn warned 11s that the table for 1961 was very approximate. All 
appropriation accounts in the publishing national accounts had been completed 
at the federal level only; a number of indirect methods using incomplete data, 
of various degrees of reliability, have been used in estimating transfer flows 
between sectors. Consumption estimates for the years 1954-6 2 wo re only 
reliably made at the federal level; the estimates of private consumption are 
either derived from budget survey data or federal estimates broken down to the 
territorial level, largely on the basis of comparative disposable incomes.
Only sketchy information was available for federal government expenditure in 
Northern Rhodesia. The detail shewn in the published Government Estimates and 
Auditor General Reports was inadequate to provide a reliable commodity analysis 
of government consumption. Finally, and most serious,trade statistics were 
not available at the territorial level for the years of federation. There was 
no great problem in the expert side, but all the impoft figures were derived 
figures. It was possible to complete the table for 1961 only because satis­
factory production data have recently become available through the completion 
of the census of industrial production for 1961. The table was therefore 
unique in its construction; usually consumption or production are the derived 
figures, but here imports into each sector are fundamentally the residuals.
C_oefficients Used
\7ork ad.se proceeded - mainly in the Ministry of Finance, Lusaka - with a 
view to establishing the basic coefficients to be used in the projections. 
Accordingly, income and expenditure elasticity coefficients (for Africans 
and Europeans separately) were computed, using the family budget studies that 
already exist for Zambia,. Estimates of trends in productivity per worker were 
made, based on the available production census and employment data. The 
incidence of direct taxation on companies was also computed for mining and 
other sectors. (Tax receipts had already been classified by tin, Control 
Statistical Office, Salisbury, by originating sector; allowance was made for 
recent changes in tax rates).
It was assumed as a starting point that input-output ratios and components 
of total supply remain an in the bane year. This assumption was modified 
when price and wage changes were introduced and when import substitution was 
expected to take plane. "Then projecting the consumption of electricity by 
the copper industry, allowance was also made for additional electricity inputs 
due to the changing composition of copper production, that is, the increase 
of electrolytic relative to blister copper. Inputs into agriculture were 
largely treated as a function of the monetary component of agricultural 
production.
Assumptions and Procedures: Projections for 1963 (Taxes Assumed Unchanged)
The 1965 matrix was projected in two stages. Stage One involved 
projections Xrow 1961 to 19^3 at 1961 -prices. Stage Two involved the 
introduction of estimated wage and price changes between 1961 and 1965*
In finalizing the 1965 projections, account ve,s taken of the fact that the 
faster increase assumed in wages than in import prices causes the volume of 
imports and consumption to increase. The initial projection of consumption 
c,t fixed (1 9 6 1) prices had thus to be roughly adjusted.
Finally, the test for a normal consumption function for the two racial 
groups was separately applied; namely, that gross incomes, personal taxes, 
personal savings, and consumption expenditure bear reasonable relationships 
to one another, judged by past experience, allowance being made for changes 
in average earnings.
Projections for 1970 (Taxes Assumed Unchanged)
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The 1965 table was then carried forward to 1970, keeping the seme prices, 
wa -e rates, and tax rates* In projecting for 1970 considerable carc was 
taken to establish the basic assumptions to be made concerning (1 ) the level 
of comper sales and pr auction, (2) the scope for inprrt substitution, and 
(3) the level of govern cnt investment and current expenditure.
The Mission was fortunate in having; access to a number of independent 
studies (projections) concerning the future demand for copper. It also 
conferred with the authorities concerned rcpardinp the expected chanpes in the 
domestic capacity to produce.
The industry experts had assembled a complete inventory of existing 
projects and their current capacity utilization, as well as a list of additional 
•projects expected to materialize between 1963 mnd 1970, The first exercise 
in this case was to estimate the capacity utilization of existing projects by 
1965 and the additional projects expected to materialize between 1963 end 1965. 
Estimates were made of press output of the additional projects expected to 
materialize between 1963 and 19 6 5. Then estimates ol press output of the 
additional projects expected to materialize between 1963 end 1970 were made.
The additional press output by sectors was further broken down into consumption, 
intermediate sales, investment, and exports. a result a separate matrix
for intermediate sales was constructed, showinp the additional output of 
intermediate soles by producinp and consuninp sectors. This matrix showed 
the additional intermediate products to be produced by domestic industry, 
above 1965 levels (at 1965 prices).
The additional press output and intermediate sales by sector were added 
to the 1965 levels. The press .utput of commodity sectors boinp exopeneously 
determined, the implication for total inputs was traced by i'irst assuninp no 
import replacement• Domestically produced inputs thus projected were then 
c 0;pared with the input-output matrix for intermediate sales, and the balance 
was used to adjust imports of intermediate sales. Acc unt was also taken of 
the additional electricity inputs for metal nanufacturinp, the fertilizer plant, 
and -tlicr manufacturinp plants. The relevant total input requirements were 
accordingly adjusted. These estimates were sufficient to determine the 
balance of intermediate products in the input-output matrix, and accordingly 
the press output of electricity, transport and distribution.
Total investment (both povern.lent end private) was arbitrarily estimated 
in the first instance on the basis of what it should be to play a leadinp 
role in activatinp the economy raid creatinp bip rises in employment; later 
it was adjusted by reference to the total investment implied in the sector 
proprams. This task was made relatively easy since sector investment 
requirements were elaborated in some detail, particularly for agriculture, 
industry, power development, education, and housinp. The allocation of 
investment between the public and the private sector was made after the 
exercise on sector prop ram 3 was completed, in the li.jht of proproms for which 
the poveranent would be responsible,14 The projected increase in poverment 
'.services in real terms reflected primarily the proprmm of increasinp the 
humber of teachers.
Employment was estimated on the basis of productivity estimates for each 
sector... If employment were assui.ied to be honopeneous, the level of employment 
correspom inp to piven levels of output could be derived by makinp specific
14 It should be noted that povernment investment is carried out by povernment 
departments and does not include transfers to the private sector (e.p. throuph 
fie Industrial Development Corporation).
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assumptions about changes in productivity. The levels of employment incomes 
could be regarded as providing an employment index. Total, employment (African 
and non-African together) having been derived from target values of value added 
and assumed changes in labor productivity, specific asr. jr.ipt.icns by sector, 
regarding the increase in non-African employment, are needed to determine the 
level of African employment separately. Non-African employnent is assumed to 
remain unchanged between 1965 and 1970 for the economy as a v/hole, but to 
decline in the mining section, which would be compensated by corresponding 
increases in the nonr.ining sectors, particularly in government and manufacturing.
However, the consequent sharp rise in the African she.ro of employment 
creates an interesting technical problem, because it is impossible to assume 
that average earnings remain unchanged for any sector*s labor force as a whole, 
and for ea.ch race. If wages are unchanged for each ,_,iven job, the average will 
rise for Africans (because they advance up the ladder) and also for non-nf'ricans 
(because their less skilled jobs are lost to Africans); the working assumption 
was made that the effect of the change in composition was to increase the 
average earnings for both races in the same proportion, for any sector.
Consumption was estimated for each ra.ee separately on the basis of 
coefficients mentioned above and imports were again obtained as a residual, 
except for agriculture, where exports were considered to be wha.tevor would not 
be consumed locally.
’.That then emerged was that those various developments would cause a big 
deficit in the balance cf payments for 1970> assuming existin-; royalty arrange­
ments and tax rales. Table 1 brings tils out. The policies required to 
close this gap are discussed in Appendix C.
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APPENDIX B
Use of the Matrix to Show the Economic Strategy Required (adapted fron 
the Mission's Report, Chapter I, Paragraph 74 to 84)
For the year 1970, we sketched the sort cf economic structure that would 
satisfy the following conditions:
1. to provide at least 150,000 more jobs than there are in 1964;
2 to imply significant improvements in living standards, more speci­
fically, a rise in average African real consumption -per head by a.t least 
one quarter;
3 to be compatible with a balance in foreign payments;
4 to contain no excess of purchasing power with inflationary
implications;
5 to.act as a base for further and faster advances in the 1 9 7 0's 
(implying a high rate of investment).
These constitute an economic expression of the government's major political 
objectives. It should be clearly understood at the outset that while it is 
a relatively simple exercise to sketch out an economic program, its achievement 
will require a tremendous effort by the government to mobilize the will and 
the abilities of the people. The structure projected here for 1970 is there­
fore not to be considered a forecast, but rather as the sort cf economic 
situation which would meet the requirements indicated above, especially the 
rise in employment• The methods are described in Appendix A,
The whole set of projections adds up to a comprehensive program. The 
rise in copper revenues would finance increased government services (such as 
education) and government construction; this would expand incomes, leading 
to higher consumption, which would in turn widen the market for manufactured 
consumer goods and for foodstuffs, providing a bigger demand for agriculture,! 
products; the rising flow of goods would require more transport and provide 
more work for those engaged in distribution and other services; the general 
economic boom would stimulate private construction in offices, houses, shops, 
and the like.
The program is internally consistent. If the industrial expansion were 
slow, it would be difficult to find markets for the food; if agricultural 
output lagged, there would be heavier imports of food and agricultural materials
than the country could pay for.
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The Projected Rise in Demand
Table 2. Gross Dca.iestic 
Expenditure at Factor Cost by Type, 1961 
(actual, 1965 (projected), and 1970 (project.! at 1969 prices)
(£ nillions)
1961
actual
1965
Projected
1970
Projectt
Non-African consumption 52 56 67
African consumption subsistence 26 33 38
African consumption ca.sh 36 51 84
Government consumption 25 37 56
Government investment 9 17 30
Private fixed investment 29 36 IK
Change in stocks + 9 - 5 + 3
Export surplus (goods and services) 25 35 4
liinus indirect taxes zJL =11
Gross domestic expenditure a„t factor
cost 204 251 A
Source: See Appendix A
The main cbjectivos of this strategy being the crea.tion of employment, the 
basic quantitative targets refer to manpower, not to the national income... 
However, we will start fro:/, conventional categories of national inccoe analysis. 
Table 2 shows how the increases in demand would be injected in the economy.
The impetus would cone from government consunption and government investment, 
which would rise by about 50 and 75 Per cent respectively between 1965 end 1970. 
This would inpart an upward momentum to the whole economy, enabling employment 
(especially mfrican) to prow. Largely because of higher employment, iifrican 
cash consumption would rise by 65 per cent. Talcing subsistence output into.accou: 
the total increase in African consunption would be 2^ 5 per cent; that is, 
average levels of living would rise about 25 per cent, allowing for the popu­
lation increa.sc. Non-African consumption would also rise, mainly due to the 
fa.ct tha.t the Europeans in Zambia in 1970 will be a more highly skilled and 
professional body than today. But the proportionate rise could be smaller, 
so the inequalities in levels of consumption would become less marked (apart 
from the effect of tax changes which will be considered below). On the 
assumptions made, investment overseas (the export surplus) will fall sharply.
Private investment should react sharply, however, more than doubling, from 
levels which will still be relatively low in 1965. Altogether, fixed invest­
ment (excluding stocks) would rise from 21 per cent of gross domestic expenditure 
to 30 per cent, a very high figure by international standards, and providing- 
on excellent point of departure for the 1970*s.
The Projected Rise in Outaut
The necessary output of the different sectors ox the economy by 1970, 
to meet the rise in demand, is indicated in Table 3*
Table 3» Gross Domestic 
Product by Sector, 1961 (actual), 1965 
(projected), and 1970 (projected at 1965 prices) 
(£ millions)
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1961
Actual
1965
Projected
1970
Projected
Per cent 
change 
1965 to 1970
fining 
1agriculture0
96 108 124 15
Commercial 9 10 20 100
Subsistence 21 27 31 15
Manufacturing 10 16 31 97
Construction 9 14 28 100
Distribution 14 17 28 65
Government services 13 20 30 30
Other*3 __32 -22 J52 28
Gross Domestic Product 204 251 343 37
Source: See Appendix A.
a Includes fishing and forestry,
^ Electricity and water, transport and communications, miscellaneous services.
A rise in demand on the scale indicated would involve a big increase in 
imports. It would therefore require a big increase in copper exports; 
output of copper should rise from 680 thousand short tons in 1965 to at least 
800 thousand in 1970, or by at least 18 per cent. Study of the possibilities 
of commercial agriculture and manufacturing indicates that in both these 
sectors output could double. Output in subsistence agriculture would rise 
with the help of extension services, but more slowly - about 1 per cent faster 
than the population living off agriculture. The increase in construction is 
necessary to spur the economic expansion and to make it possible. The increase 
in government service is needed to provide both more teaching and more admini­
stration, as will be required in a planned economy. Changes in output in 
other sectors would be induced by the increases just described.
Altogether the rise in the domestic product of 37 por cent would be 
equivalent to over 6 per cent a year, about twice as fast as the population is 
rising (implying a growth of seme 3 per cent a year in income per head of the 
population).
The Projected Rise in Employment
Table 4 and figure 1 show the effect that this program would have on 
employment by 1970. Company information is that employment will, if anything, 
iall in the mines because of mechanization. There will also be small 
increases in employment in agriculture; much of the increase in commercial 
ikput will come from farmers who count as "self-employed1 (and are therefore 
k included in the table). The rises in employment in the other sectors 
reilect the changes in output discussed above, with allowance for expected 
improvements in productivity.
Figure 1. African Ep.pl oynont (Source: Monthly Dijest 
cf Statistics and Mission Projections)
Table 4, Employment by Race and Sector, 1961 raid 1963 (actual); 1965 and 1970 (projected)0'
(thousands)
o^n- i^i’rican
1965
Total
1961 1963
African -- ------
1965 1970 ,  ^ 1970 b 1965 1970
' Projected Projected 1961 1963 Projected Projected 1961 1963 Projected Projected
Lining „ (
.Agriculture1" * 
Manufacturing 
Construction^ 
Distribution 
Government services 
Other
Total
ld
42
30
19
30
15
35
.59)
23ci
41
34
16
24
109
224
42
39
21
33
22
59
6.0
27S
42
43
36 
60
37 
92
J 13oG
3
1
2
2
7 )
6)
_i)
32
8 0O 6 50 49 50 48
1 1 1 39 35 40 49
3 3 3 21 19 24 39
2 3 3 32 26 36 63
5 5 22) 27 42
13 7 3 41) 127 66 100
.1 7 J§5) 66 8032 33 33 270 256 309 421
Source: 1961 and 1963? Monthly Bulletin of Statistics; 1965 and 1970, Mission projections*
a Excludes those wcrkinj for African employers outside the main towns, estimates in the census report at 41 taousend miles 
in 1963.
^ On the basis of fijures for March, June, end September. 
c Includes forestry end Mishina.
^ Includes finance.
/
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APPENDIX C
Use of the Matrix to Show the financial Policies Required (Adapted from 
the Mission’s Report, Chapter VIII, Paragraph 121 to 133)•"
hn attempt has been nade to illustrate quantitatively the prospective need 
fcr foreiyn borrowing by neons of projections of chanyes in assets and 
liabilities over the period. These projections suyyest that the development 
plans for 1964-70 may not require much net foreign borrowin';, provided that 
both budyet and credit policy are pursued as indicated here. If copper prices 
rise relatively more than the level of import prices, which is not unlikely, 
the need for foreijn borrowing will be correspondingly smaller.
Table 5* Projections for Government Account,
Nation’s Capital Account, and Balance of Payments for 1970, 
on xJ.terna.tive Assumptions on Tax Rates and Government nxp enditures
(<£ million)
•\r
J\. Y
Government account
Net taxation 65 87
Expenditure on yoods and services 86 86
Surplus (deficit = ~) -21 1
fixed yross capital formation 30 30
Gross saviny 9 31
Nation’s capital a,ccount
Personal saviny 15 14
C orpor,at e s aviny 57 51
Private saviny 72 65
Government saviny 9 31
Total saviny 81 96
Net foreiyn borrowiny 26 11
Gross real investment 107 107
Government yross fixed capital formation 30 30
Increase in stocks 3 3
Private fixed capital formation 74 74
Balance of payments
Export surplus of yoods and services 4 11
Net transfers abroad 30 22
Net foreiyn borrowiny (balance of payments deficit) 26 11
Source: See Appendix A.
a Alternative X: As3uuiny for taxes and royalties at 1963-64 rate 
(see Appendix A, Table 1).
Alternative Y: The folio-winy chanyes are assumed:
1. AL1 mineral royalties transferred to government; 
Tax of 5 per cent on export value of copper;
Duties on imports from Southern Rhodesia raised; 
Duties and indirect taxes for a number of non- 
essential. yoods increased by an average of 30 
per cent as compared with present rates;
Personal income tax increased, the effect beiny 
to raise the averaje rate on non—..fricans from 
6.4 per cent to 11.6 per cent of total income and 
for Africans from 1.5 per cent to 5*1 pen cent.
2.
3.
4.
5.
* Minor chanyes result from deletion of tables.
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To illustrate quantitatively the rough order of .^ovcrnnent expenditure 
and the level of taxation required by 1970, two alternative projections are 
presented in Table 5* alternative X assumes inplorientation of the development 
plans suggested for government consumption and government gross capital 
formation, while tax ra/tms are assumed to be .intained as in 1963* This 
alternative is identical with the projection presented for 1970 in appendix A. 
alternative Y assumes that government expenditure on goods and services is the 
seme as in alternative X, but that tax rates are increased as indicated in the 
footnotes to Table 5*
U.S might be expected, alternative X shows largo deficits both on 
government account and on the balance of payments. ALthough projects of this 
kind may have large margins of error, they clearly indicate the need for tax 
increases. If a policy in line with alternative X were pursued, the result 
would also be a relatively strong wag© mid price increase which again would 
further adversely affect tho balance of payments.
Alternative Y is intended to represent an approximate illustration of the 
level of taxation needed to avoid harmful wa ;e and price increases end to 
prevent the deficit on the balance of payments froi' becoming too laige. The 
balance-of-payments deficit of £11 million generated in this alternative 
appears not to exceed the volume of foreign capital supply possible and the 
use of exchange reserves justifiable at this stage of development. However,
the figures in the table must be conceived as 1', lustrations only. Final
decisions on the level of taxation in years to come must, of course, be taken 
on the basis of all currently a.vailable information. The situation will no 
doubt be rather different from that ’.escribed in alternative Y; one conclusion 
can be drawn with certainty, though, that the implementation of development 
programs requires on the assumptions made a very substantial increase of tax 
rates.
It will be noted that the entire increase of total saving in alternative 
Y as compared with alternative X is due to increased government saving, while 
corporate saving, shows a substantial decline, due to the tax on copper exports.
Table 6 shows fi ures for the government account, the nation's capital 
account, and the balance of payments for the entire period 1966-70. Figures 
for 1966 to 1969, which arc implied in the totals for 1966-70, have been 
estimated by interpolation between the projections for 1965 and 1970. Under 
the assumptions made, a government surplus of £16 million would accumulate 
in this period, and the b.?!ance-of-payments surpluses in the first years would 
be offset by deficits in the later yec.rs. The government's surplus would 
decline from £6 million in 1965 to £1 nillion in 1970, and the balance of 
payments would deteriorate from a surplus of £ 17 million in 1965 to a deficit 
of £11 million in 1970. The estimates for 1970 arc made at 1965 prices.
If copper prices should develop more favorably than prices for Zambian imports, 
which is not unlikely, both the budget surplus -and the balance of payments 
would be correspondingly more favorable. The projections for each of the 
years within the period (not all included in the table) snow that Zambia, 
under the assumptions male, would have a surplus on its balance of payments 
until 1968 inclusive, but from then there would be increasing deficits up 
to 1970 and Ia,ter. This illustrates the need for accumulating exchange 
reserves for the purpose of financing deficits on the balance of payments 
which may emerge in a few years, as a consequence of the development program. 
Increased government revenues and budget surpluses are the means by which this 
can be acHeved.
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Table 6, Projections for Government 
Account, Nation's Capital -account, and 
Balance of Payments in Total for the Period 1966-70 
(£ millions at 1965 prices)
Total
1965 1970 1966-
Government account
Net taxation 60 87 377
Government expenditure on goods and services 54 36 361
Surplus, net lending 6 1 16
fixed gross ca- ital formation 17 30 122
Gross saving 23 31 133
Nation's capital account
Personal saving 10 14 60
Corporate s aving 32 51 216
Private saving 42 65 276
Government saving 23 31 133
Total gross saving 65 96 414
Net foreign lending 17 -11 -
Gross read investment 48 107 414
Government gross fixed capital formation 17 30 122
Private gross fixed capital formation 36 74 279
Increase in stocks - 5 3 13
Balance of payments
Export surplus of goods and services 36 11 104
Net transfers abroad 19 22 104
Net foreign lending 17 -11 -
Applying the method described above, under the assumptions underlying 
Tables 5 end 6, projections have been made cf total credit supply to the 
priv-Ae sector and the increase in private financial assets over the five-year 
period 1966-70, According to these projections the credit supply to the 
private sector would have to be not less than £82 million in the period to 
achieve the speed of development aimed at, and this credit expansion would 
create an increase cf private claims amounting to £66 million. An attempt 
at allocating the credit supply by lending sectors and the increase in private 
claims by type of assets suggests that more than half of the total credit 
supply would come from credit institutions, primarily agricultural credit 
institutions, commercial banks, and building societies, Moreover, more than 
half of the increase in private financial assets would take the form of 
increased deposits,
furthermore, separate projections for 1970 seem to indicate that the 
total credit supply in this year, under the assumptions made, would be as 
much as £28 million and the increase in private claims would be £16 million.
As the government surplus would be only £1 million, practically the entire 
difference is assumed to be obtained by a reduction of exchange reserves 
and by borrowing abroad.
To provide the credit expansion needed to implement the development plans 
it appears that the government would have in 1970 to supply the private sector 
(credit institutions and the public) with loans at an amount significantly 
larger than its budget surplus. Thus, while government and the central bank 
in 1964-65, as we have seen, would have to play an active role to reduce 
liquidity of the private sectors, they would by 1970 have to do the opposite,
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supply loans (or buy securities) to increase liquidity. This is due to the 
fact that under the assumptions made, holdings of foreign assets by the central 
bank would significantly increase in the former period, whereas in the latter 
they would not change,,. The activity of credit institutions would have to be 
considerably increased, which illustrates the desirability of rationalizing 
the Zambian credit system to enable it to cope with the expanded tasks imposed 
upon it by the development program#
The projections made in this Appendix are intended to serve three purposes. 
In the first place, they demonstrate a method by which broad financial aggregates 
can be projected to provide the framework within which a detailed financial 
plan could be prepared by the Ministry of Finance.,. Second, they serve to 
illustrate the kind of financial thinking which the Mission believes is 
essential in development planning - that the single purpose of a financial plan 
is to show how budget and credit policy can and should be applied to implement 
the real development plan. Third, it is hoped that the projections express 
a rough approximation of some of the magnitudes of the main financial trans­
actions discussed in this report.
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APPENDIX D
The Use of the Matrix to Devise the Targets for Manpower and Educational 
Policy (Adapted from the Missionfs Report, Chapter VI, Paragraph 42 to 48)
The development of Zambia’s human resources must be guided by manpower 
needs..* Using estimates from various sources for the stocks of high-level 
manpower in ea.ch sector in 1961, rough projections of needs were made for five- 
year intervals until 1980. For the years i965 and 1970, these estimates were 
made on a sectoral basis, increasing the present stocks according to the 
projected output for each sector (see Appendix A).
In global terms, these projections, rough as they are, indicate beyond 
doubt that Zambia’s need will far outstrip local supplies for many years.
Even ignoring the needs of the educational system, the demand for "administr­
ative and professional p e r s o n n e l 11^  ps likely to rise from about $,000 in 1961 
to over 4,000 in 1965 and over 6,000 in 1970. Most of these must be graduates 
or professionally qualified. Second-level manpower, usually with school 
certificates and some training, will be required in much greater numbers; 
needs will rise from nearly 11,000 in 1961 to about 15,000 in 1965 and to over 
23,000 in 1970. In addition, the educational system itself will adsorb many 
school certificate holders, some as teachers but most as students at the 
higher levels; the educational plans suggested would require in total about 
2,300 school certificate holders in 1965 and 5,500 in 1970. This would raise 
the gross needs for school certificate holders (or above) from almost 22,000 
in 1965 to 39,000 in 1970. The Mission would not claim that these are 
accurate estimates and repeats its conviction that a thorough manpower survey 
must be undertaken as soon as possible, nor is education the sole qualification 
for high-level work. But, as orders of magnitude, these rough estimates 
establish the dimensions of the educational task facing the country.
It must be the explicit purpose of the educational system, and of other 
institutions of training, to provide the j>eople of Zambia with the education 
and skills they need to build and develop the country.
^5 Precise definitions of each category of manpower are given in a survey 
by Taylor and Pea.rson.
